This guide adds HMAC request authentication to your API so it accepts signed requests from ShadowFeed and skips x402 payment for those calls.
If you’re using Hosted Mirror mode (we host your data, no API server on your side), skip this entire guide. HMAC is only needed for Partner Bridge mode.
Already selling this data via x402 on Solana, Base, or another EVM chain? That’s the most common case. You do not stand up a new endpoint — you point ShadowFeed at the same API you already gate with x402. ShadowFeed adds a second payment rail (STX on Stacks) in front of it: the agent pays ShadowFeed in STX, and ShadowFeed proves itself to your server with an HMAC signature so your existing x402 paywall lets the call through for free. Your direct Solana/EVM buyers are unaffected. Read Coexisting with your existing x402 paywall before wiring anything.
Use the SDK if you can.@shadowfeed/provider-sdk ships this verifier as a drop-in Express/Hono adapter plus a shadowfeed verify command that handshake-tests your endpoint before you go live — and it gets the canonical path right automatically (the #1 thing hand-rolled integrations get wrong). Hand-rolling is fully supported and documented below, but whichever path you choose, run the connection test before activating — see Verify your wiring before going live.
If your endpoint is already gated by x402 (Solana, Base, other EVM), nothing about that setup changes. ShadowFeed becomes an additional, HMAC-authenticated caller in front of the same route:
Direct buyer ──pay USDC (Solana/EVM x402)──▶ your x402 middleware ──▶ data ▲ShadowFeed agent ──pay STX (Stacks)──▶ ShadowFeed │ no payment — just an HMAC signature │ │ └─ signs ─┘ HMAC valid ⇒ bypass x402 ⇒ data
Two rules make this work:
1
Run the HMAC check BEFORE your x402 middleware
A ShadowFeed call carries no x402 payment — it carries an X-Sf-* signature instead. If your x402 middleware runs first, it returns 402 Payment Required to ShadowFeed before the HMAC verifier ever sees the request.
2
On a valid signature, bypass the paywall and serve data
Set a flag (e.g. skipX402) your payment middleware honors. On a missing or invalid signature, fall through to your normal x402 flow so your direct Solana/EVM buyers keep paying as usual.
A broken HMAC bypass is silent revenue loss, not a loud error. If the signature fails to verify (wrong secret, or — far more often — a path mismatch), the request falls through to your x402 paywall, which answers 402. ShadowFeed treats any non-2xx upstream response as a failed delivery: the agent’s STX is not credited to you, and they receive an error even though they paid. You won’t see a 401 in your own logs — you’ll see a 402 you served to ShadowFeed and wonder why revenue is zero. This is why the path rules and the pre-launch test below are not optional.
Pick the language tab matching your stack. All three implementations use the same canonical string format and are mutually compatible.
Get the PATH right or every single request fails — this is the most common integration killer.ShadowFeed signs the canonical string using the exact source_path you registered for the feed, then calls partner_endpoint + source_path. Your verifier must rebuild the canonical string with that same path — not necessarily what new URL(req.url).pathname returns after a mount point, reverse proxy, or x402 router has rewritten it.Two registration rules keep both sides aligned:
partner_endpoint is an origin only — https://api.you.com, no path, no trailing slash. Register https://api.you.com/v1 with feed path /whales and ShadowFeed signs /whales but calls …/v1/whales; your server sees /v1/whales ≠ /whales → 401 on every call.
source_path is the literal route your server already serves — if your real route is /whale-alerts, register exactly that. A typo or a stale /v1 prefix makes ShadowFeed hit a path that doesn’t exist → 404 on every call. (A real early integration did exactly this: it 404’d on every request and served zero data for weeks before anyone noticed — because the operator was watching their own logs for 401s that never came.)
The simple examples below assume an origin-only partner_endpoint and a router mounted at the root. If your API sits behind a path prefix, see Mounted behind a prefix or an x402 router.
TypeScript / Workers
Python / FastAPI
Go / net/http
import { Hono } from 'hono';// Replace with your existing route file.const app = new Hono<{ Bindings: { SHADOWFEED_PARTNER_SECRET: string } }>();// Add this middleware BEFORE any x402 payment middleware so signed// requests bypass the payment requirement.app.use('*', async (c, next) => { if (c.req.header('X-Sf-Partner') !== 'shadowfeed') { return next(); // not a ShadowFeed call → continue normal x402 flow } const ok = await verifyShadowfeedHmac(c.req.raw, c.env.SHADOWFEED_PARTNER_SECRET); if (!ok) return c.json({ error: 'invalid HMAC signature' }, 401); c.set('skipX402', true); // your x402 middleware reads this flag return next();});async function verifyShadowfeedHmac(req: Request, secret: string): Promise<boolean> { const ts = parseInt(req.headers.get('X-Sf-Timestamp') ?? '', 10); const nonce = req.headers.get('X-Sf-Nonce') ?? ''; const sig = req.headers.get('X-Sf-Signature') ?? ''; if (!ts || !nonce || !sig) return false; // 5-minute window — rejects replays of leaked signatures. if (Math.abs(Date.now() / 1000 - ts) > 300) return false; // Replay protection — store seen nonces in KV for 5 minutes. // (Omit if you can't tolerate the extra KV write; the timestamp window // already bounds the attack to 5 min after capture.) // // const seen = await env.NONCES.get(nonce); // if (seen) return false; // await env.NONCES.put(nonce, '1', { expirationTtl: 300 }); const enc = new TextEncoder(); const body = req.method === 'GET' ? '' : await req.clone().text(); const bodyHash = body ? [...new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', enc.encode(body)))] .map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('') : ''; const canonical = [ req.method.toUpperCase(), new URL(req.url).pathname, String(ts), nonce, bodyHash, ].join('\n'); const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey( 'raw', enc.encode(secret), { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign'], ); const expected = [...new Uint8Array( await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, enc.encode(canonical)), )].map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join(''); return sig.toLowerCase() === expected.toLowerCase();}
Where to set the secret (Cloudflare Workers):
wrangler secret put SHADOWFEED_PARTNER_SECRET# Paste the secret when prompted
This stores it as a Worker secret — accessible at runtime via c.env.SHADOWFEED_PARTNER_SECRET, never visible in your code or logs.
import os, hmac, hashlib, timefrom fastapi import FastAPI, Request, HTTPExceptionPARTNER_SECRET = os.environ["SHADOWFEED_PARTNER_SECRET"].encode()_seen_nonces: dict[str, float] = {} # swap for Redis in productionapp = FastAPI()async def verify_shadowfeed_hmac(request: Request) -> bool: ts = request.headers.get("X-Sf-Timestamp", "") nonce = request.headers.get("X-Sf-Nonce", "") sig = request.headers.get("X-Sf-Signature", "") if not (ts and nonce and sig): return False if abs(time.time() - int(ts)) > 300: return False # Replay protection — sweep + check now = time.time() expired = [n for n, t in _seen_nonces.items() if now - t > 300] for n in expired: _seen_nonces.pop(n, None) if nonce in _seen_nonces: return False _seen_nonces[nonce] = now body = await request.body() if request.method != "GET" else b"" body_hash = hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest() if body else "" canonical = "\n".join([ request.method.upper(), request.url.path, ts, nonce, body_hash, ]).encode() expected = hmac.new(PARTNER_SECRET, canonical, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest() return hmac.compare_digest(sig.lower(), expected.lower())@app.middleware("http")async def shadowfeed_partner_middleware(request: Request, call_next): if request.headers.get("X-Sf-Partner") == "shadowfeed": if not await verify_shadowfeed_hmac(request): raise HTTPException(401, "invalid HMAC signature") request.state.skip_x402 = True return await call_next(request)
Where to set the secret (typical Python deployments):
Platform
Command
Heroku
heroku config:set SHADOWFEED_PARTNER_SECRET=...
Render
Service → Environment → Add
Railway
Project → Variables → Add
Docker
docker run -e SHADOWFEED_PARTNER_SECRET=... ...
Local dev
.env file + python-dotenv
package mainimport ( "crypto/hmac" "crypto/sha256" "encoding/hex" "io" "net/http" "os" "strconv" "strings" "sync" "time")var ( partnerSecret = []byte(os.Getenv("SHADOWFEED_PARTNER_SECRET")) nonceCache = sync.Map{} // map[string]int64 — nonce → expiresUnix)func abs(n int64) int64 { if n < 0 { return -n }; return n }func verifyShadowfeedHMAC(r *http.Request) bool { tsStr := r.Header.Get("X-Sf-Timestamp") nonce := r.Header.Get("X-Sf-Nonce") sig := r.Header.Get("X-Sf-Signature") if tsStr == "" || nonce == "" || sig == "" { return false } ts, err := strconv.ParseInt(tsStr, 10, 64) if err != nil { return false } if abs(time.Now().Unix() - ts) > 300 { return false } // Replay protection if _, seen := nonceCache.Load(nonce); seen { return false } nonceCache.Store(nonce, time.Now().Unix() + 300) var bodyBytes []byte if r.Method != "GET" { bodyBytes, _ = io.ReadAll(r.Body) r.Body = io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(string(bodyBytes))) } bodyHash := "" if len(bodyBytes) > 0 { h := sha256.Sum256(bodyBytes) bodyHash = hex.EncodeToString(h[:]) } canonical := strings.Join([]string{ strings.ToUpper(r.Method), r.URL.Path, tsStr, nonce, bodyHash, }, "\n") mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, partnerSecret) mac.Write([]byte(canonical)) expected := hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)) return hmac.Equal([]byte(strings.ToLower(sig)), []byte(expected))}func shadowfeedMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler { return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if r.Header.Get("X-Sf-Partner") == "shadowfeed" { if !verifyShadowfeedHMAC(r) { http.Error(w, "invalid HMAC signature", 401) return } // Mark context so downstream skips x402 payment requirement. } next.ServeHTTP(w, r) })}
x402 frameworks often mount everything under a prefix (e.g. /api or /x402). When that happens, new URL(req.url).pathname includes the prefix — but ShadowFeed signed the path without it. Strip the known prefix before building the canonical string:
// ShadowFeed signed the source_path you registered, e.g. "/whales".// If your app is mounted at "/api", the inbound pathname is "/api/whales".const MOUNT_PREFIX = '/api'; // your mount, or '' if rootconst fullPath = new URL(req.url).pathname; // "/api/whales"const canonicalPath = fullPath.startsWith(MOUNT_PREFIX) ? (fullPath.slice(MOUNT_PREFIX.length) || '/') // "/whales" : fullPath;// → use canonicalPath (NOT fullPath) in the canonical string.
The @shadowfeed/provider-sdk adapters do this for you — they reconstruct the signed path from the route parameter, so the canonical path is identical no matter where the router is mounted. If you can adopt the SDK, you skip this class of bug entirely.
Do not make a real STX purchase your first test — it costs money and gives a vague pass/fail. Use a handshake test that signs and probes your endpoint exactly the way a buyer would, for free.
Dashboard (any stack)
SDK CLI
In your provider dashboard, click Test connection (calls POST /providers/id/:id/hmac/test). ShadowFeed signs a request with your stored secret against your first active feed’s source_path, fires it at partner_endpoint + source_path, and reports back:
Result
Meaning
ok
Signature verified, your route returned data. You’re ready.
hmac_rejected (401/403)
Secret mismatch or path mismatch — re-check both sides.
upstream_error (404/5xx)
ShadowFeed reached your host but the route 404’d or errored — check source_path and middleware ordering.
network
Couldn’t reach partner_endpoint at all — DNS, TLS, or firewall.
platform_secret_missing
Rotate the secret from the dashboard so we store an encrypted copy to sign with.
The response echoes probed_path so you can confirm ShadowFeed is hitting the exact route you expect.
If you publish a .well-known/shadowfeed-feeds.json manifest (the SDK does this automatically), run the self-handshake from your own machine:
It checks the manifest is reachable and valid, signs a GET against your first feed, and confirms your verifier accepts it and returns valid JSON — printing a green check per step.
Once the handshake passes, confirm the full payment path end-to-end with a single real purchase via the ShadowFeed Agent SDK:
import { ShadowFeed } from 'shadowfeed-agent';const sf = new ShadowFeed({ privateKey: process.env.AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY, network: 'mainnet' });const result = await sf.buy('p/your-handle/your-feed-slug');console.log(result.data); // your data, served through the HMAC-authenticated path
When it works end-to-end: the agent pays STX → ShadowFeed signs + forwards → your middleware verifies and bypasses x402 → your route returns data → 97% of the price is credited to your pending_revenue counter. Confirm via the dashboard or GET /providers/id/your-id/analytics.
Wrong secret or path mismatch (your verifier signs a different PATH than ShadowFeed did)
Re-paste secret on your server; confirm partner_endpoint is origin-only and your canonical PATH equals the registered source_path (strip mount prefixes)
ShadowFeed reports 404 / “route exists?”
source_path doesn’t match a real route, or partner_endpoint already contains part of the path
Register partner_endpoint as origin-only and source_path as the exact route your server serves
Buyers pay STX but you earn nothing; your logs show a 402 served to ShadowFeed
HMAC bypass didn’t fire, so the call fell through to your x402 paywall
Run the HMAC check before x402; fix the secret/path so the bypass triggers (use Test connection)
Some calls 401, others succeed
Clock drift > 5 min
Sync your server clock (NTP)
401 with body hash mismatch
Body modified by proxy/middleware before verifier sees it
Verify BEFORE any body parsing; use req.clone().text() (TS)
If you use Claude Code to maintain your codebase, paste this prompt to bootstrap the integration:
I want to integrate my API as a ShadowFeed external data provider. My stack is [Cloudflare Workers / FastAPI / Go / etc.]. I have the HMAC secret saved as SHADOWFEED_PARTNER_SECRET. The full integration guide is at docs.shadowfeed.app/providers/hmac-integration.Walk me through:
Adding the HMAC verifier middleware to my existing routes (preserve current x402 / auth)
Setting the env var on my deployment platform
Testing the integration end-to-end
My API base URL is https://api.mycompany.com and the feed I want to expose is at /v1/whales.
Claude can read this doc, your codebase, and walk you through the wiring step-by-step.
Replace each placeholder with the actual values per request.
Component
Value
METHOD
Uppercase HTTP verb: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH
PATH
The registered source_path — no host, no query string. Must match byte-for-byte on both sides; trailing slash matters. Don’t put a query string in source_path (your verifier’s pathname would drop it and break the match).
TIMESTAMP
Unix seconds (10 digits in 2026). Must be within ±300s of server clock.
NONCE
Random unique string per request. Recommended: UUID v4.
SHA256(BODY)
Lowercase hex SHA-256 of raw request body. Empty string "" if no body.
Use constant-time comparison when verifying — never use plain string equality. Python: hmac.compare_digest. Go: hmac.Equal. TypeScript: compare byte-by-byte after equal-length check.